Some thoughts on the evolution of the banking system and the process of financial intermediation by Loretta J. Mester
I
will focus my discussion on three areas I believe are important ones when consider-
ing the evolution of the financial services industry: consolidation and the economies
gained from it; governance issues, which are emerging as the structure of the banking
industry has changed and continues to change; and the decline in the benefits gained
from the set of contracts we call a “bank.” In particular, I’ll argue that the decline in
relationship lending perhaps reflects a decline in demand for bank liabilities rather
than a decline in demand for relationship lending. 
Consolidation
A striking amount of consolidation has occurred in the banking industry over the past
twenty years, and it has led to some very large banks. In the United States about
11,500 bank mergers took place from 1980 through 2005, which is an average of about
440 mergers per year. And the size of mergers has risen over time. For example, in
January 2004 JPMorgan Chase agreed to buy Bank One, creating a $1.1 trillion bank
holding company. In October 2003 Bank of America agreed to buy FleetBoston, creat-
ing a $900 billion bank holding company and making Bank of America the second-
largest U.S. bank holding company, with $1.4 trillion in assets. (Citigroup is the largest,
with $1.6 trillion in assets.)
At the same time, the number of commercial banks in the United States has fallen
significantly over the past twenty years (see Figure 1). The number was relatively
stable at about 14,000 from about 1975 to 1985 and then started to fall to about 7,500
in 2005. The average asset size of U.S. banks (in real terms) has more than tripled
since 1985 and is more than $1.1 billion. Assets are being redistributed from smaller
banks to larger banks—now over 75 percent of industry assets are in banks with more
then $10 billion in assets (measured in 2005 dollars), compared with 40 percent in
1985 (see Figure 2).
Although the number of institutions has fallen, the number of offices has not
(see Figure 3). There were fewer than 14,000 ATMs in 1979, but by 2004 there were
more than 380,000, almost thirty times as many.
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Also, there has been new bank entry even as consolidation has occurred.
Nonetheless, by several measures, banking is becoming more concentrated (see
Figure 4). The top ten banks in terms of asset size are holding over 50 percent of
industry assets, compared with about 25 percent in 1985. 
The question is, What has consolidation meant for competition in the industry?
Here, it is important to consider the drivers of the consolidation. Consolidation need
not imply that the industry is less competitive. Banking is subject to the usual antitrust
safeguards: The Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 and amended Bank Holding Company Act
set deposit concentration limits on proposed mergers (that is, no merger can result
in an institution with more than 10 percent of the deposits in the nation or more than
30 percent of deposits in any state [but states can set their own limits, and initial
entry into the state is not subject to the 30 percent limit]). And merger applications
are examined for their potential effects on competition.
Note also that consolidation is a global phenomenon, which means deregulation
in the United States was not the only important driver. (According to a 2001 Group of
Ten study of consolidation in thirteen countries in the 1990s, the number of banks
fell in almost every country. Japan was an exception, but that is because the country
changed the definition of “bank”; Belgium gained just two banks; Australia gained ten
banks, with the number rising from 34 in 1990 to 44 in 1999, but the industry remained
concentrated with the five largest banks holding 74 percent of deposits.)
The drivers of consolidation have led to increases in competition at the same
time consolidation has occurred. Two important drivers have been deregulation and
technological change. The removal of geographic restrictions on branching was one
of the drivers of consolidation. Regulations that restricted the geographic extent of
banking led to fewer banks and smaller banks than would have arisen in equilibrium
without the regulations. Geographic deregulation also increased the contestability
of markets.
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Number of Commercial Banks in the United States
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I mean not only changes afforded to the delivery of financial services by computers
and telecommunications but also financial innovation—for example, risk-management
models. Technological and financial innovation allowed for the commoditization of
financial services and in turn led to increased competition; new competitors that
were able to produce only a piece of the banks’ output could enter and compete with
banks for that piece. Technology also increased the geographic scope of markets.
Consolidation and Scale Economies
While we understand some of the forces driving the industry toward consolidation,
consolidation does present some conundrums. Consolidation has created some very
large banks, and bank managers often cite the desire to capture scale economies as
one of their motivations for mergers and acquisitions. But much of the empirical liter-
ature on banking says these economies are exhausted at relatively small sizes. For
example, in his conference presentation, Bob DeYoung argues that there are two
types of banking: relationship banking and transactions banking. The first is low volume.
The second is high volume, which suggests there are scale economies in the second
type, but much of the literature doesn’t find them. Another puzzle is why the official
government statistics suggest that productivity in banking rose at a slower rate from
1994 to 2002 than in the rest of the corporate sector, despite the technological
advances in banking.
My answer to these conundrums is that much of the literature has not adequately
evaluated scale economies and productivity because it has not adequately accounted
for the endogenous choice of risk by banks. At its heart, banking is about handling
risk, and the amount of risk to take on is a choice of bank management. Thus, to my
mind the changing nature of banking is a risk-management story and not just a dereg-
ulation story. Technology is important to the extent that it enables new types of risk
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Distribution of Banks in the United States by Asset Size
Note: Size categories are based on total assets (domestic and foreign) and are in 2005 dollars. Data exclude credit card banks.
Source: Quarterly Reports of Condition and Income, Federal Reserve System
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management (more diversification at less cost, more effective risk-management models
at a given cost, etc.). But the next chapter of the banking story is a capital and systemic
risk story (for example, Basel II, financial stability), and bank management becomes
an important player in the story (and, therefore, so does corporate governance).
Hughes, Mester, and Moon (2001) investigate whether economies of scale in
banking are illusive (that is, do not exist) or elusive (that is, evade detection by the
methods used in the literature). We conclude that the scale economies are real but
that the usual methods used to find them fail because they do not adequately view
banks as risk-management operations. The paper lays out an approach to measuring
scale economies based on the role of the bank as an intermediary. Larger scale may
mean better diversification, which leads to reduced liquidity risk on the liability side
of the balance sheet and reduced credit risk on the asset side. Thus, larger scale can
lead to reduced marginal cost of risk taking and reduced marginal cost of risk man-
agement, all else being equal. But all else is not necessarily equal because risk taking
is endogenous. If banks respond to the lower cost of risk management by taking on
more risk, then we would see two effects of increased scale of operations. The fact
that scale-related diversification reduces cost, all else being equal, we call the diver-
sification effect. But risk taking can increase cost, all else being equal, if banks have
to spend more to manage increased risk. This effect, which we call the risk-taking
effect, might mask scale economies that derive from better diversification unless we
incorporate risk into the analysis.
In Hughes, Mester, and Moon (2001) we find constant returns to scale in our
sample of large bank holding companies when we estimate a standard cost-function
model. However, when we estimate our more general model, we find significant
returns to scale. Our general model incorporates capital structure into the produc-
tion model and generalizes managers’ objectives from profit maximization to value
maximization. (If bank managers care about risk, then they care about more than just
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Number of FDIC-Insured Commercial Banks, Branches, and Offices in the United States
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for lower risk. So the maximization problem from which scale economies are derived
should account for this.) Our findings suggest that large bank holding companies
(BHCs) are using less than the cost-minimizing level of capital and that small BHCs
are using more than the cost-minimizing level. We find increasing returns to scale,
with estimates ranging from 1.19 to 1.24. We find evidence of the diversification
effect: An increase in diversification and asset size from the minimum to maximum
value in the sample implies an increase in scale economies of 0.16. (Diversification is
the degree of macroeconomic diversification in a BHC’s geographic operations, mea-
sured by the correlation in unemployment rates over states in which a BHC oper-
ates.) We find evidence of the risk-taking effect: An increase in risk implies a
decrease in scale economies. And we also find evidence of an inefficiency effect: An
increase in inefficiency implies a decrease in scale economies. Thus, the results of
this paper support the conclusion that scale economies exist, but the usual method
cannot find them because it ignores the fact that bank risk taking is endogenous.
Larger scale means a lower cost per unit of risk—a scale economy—but larger scale
means that banks have the capacity to take on more risk.
Other research (Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon 1999, 1996) has found that
geographic diversity is positive for banks’ performance and safety. Thus, consolida-
tion has led to real benefits for the industry. These studies look at within-state,
regional interstate, and interstate consolidation strategies and their effects on banks’
expected profit, profit risk, and insolvency risk and find that geographic diversity was
positive for performance and safety and that the gains are priced by capital markets
as shown by improved market value. The clearest gains come from expansion across
state lines, especially when the expansion diversifies macroeconomic risk, which low-
ers systemic risk. The studies find that larger banks, all else being equal, tend to take
on greater risk, but, holding size constant, geographic diversity is related to lower
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risk. Thus, consolidation that is accompanied by greater geographic diversification
significantly offsets the tendency of larger banks to take on more risk. Hughes, Lang,
Mester, and Moon (1996) find that geographic expansion is also associated with
lower deposit volatility, higher expected return and risk for efficient banks (that
is, movement along the expected return-risk frontier), and higher efficiency (that is,
movement toward the frontier) for inefficient banks.
Consolidation and Corporate Governance
Consolidation has positive aspects—scale economies and risk diversification—but
are all motivations benign? In my view, consolidation means that corporate gover-
nance issues in banking will become increasingly important. Evidence from the bank
merger literature raises the question of whether bank mergers are value enhancing
or driven by empire building. Corporate control problems in banking can exist
because the relationship between bank owners (stockholders) and bank managers is
a principal-agent relationship and their goals are not always aligned. Some mecha-
nisms exist that help control the behavior of bank managers, but they may not be
totally effective. These mechanisms include labor market controls (compensation,
reputation) and capital market controls (stockholders’ meetings, interbank loan and
CD markets, market monitoring for large deposits, bank supervision, takeovers). The
takeover market in banking is not necessarily effective in controlling bank manage-
ment since informational problems may limit this control and restrictions on bank
ownership (for example, prohibitions against the mixing of banking and commerce)
can limit potential buyers.
We call managers who can resist market discipline entrenched. Entrenched man-
agers can consume agency goods, including perquisites, avoiding effort (shirking),
avoiding risk, engaging in discrimination, and/or empire building. Hughes, Lang,
Mester, Moon, and Pagano (2003) look for evidence of managerial entrenchment in
the relationship between ownership structure and financial performance of the highest-
level bank holding companies and for evidence of empire building in the relationship
between asset size, asset acquisitions, and asset sales and financial performance. The
paper identifies entrenched management with poor bank performance and finds that
entrenchment is associated with higher managerial ownership, better growth oppor-
tunities, worse financial performance, and smaller asset size. Selling assets is associ-
ated with better performance at all banks. Larger asset size obtained by internal
growth (not by acquisition) is associated with better performance at all banks
whether or not management is entrenched, which is evidence of scale economies.
However, while acquiring assets is associated with better performance at banks
without entrenched managers, it is associated with worse performance at banks with
entrenched managers. Thus, while research suggests consolidation is associated with
better performance on average, not all consolidation is value enhancing. Managerial
incentives and good corporate governance need to be considered. 
Regulatory oversight of consolidation is still warranted. None of the research
results suggest that regulators should stop considering market power when consid-
ering whether to approve mergers since the results are based on those mergers that
have been approved. Our research indicates that managerial entrenchment can lead
to inefficient consolidation strategies by banks. This problem occurs particularly at
banks that have high levels of managerial ownership and better growth opportunities.
Thus, regulation should help ensure good governance. Supervisory oversight is likely
needed to contain systemic risk. And regulatory oversight is perhaps needed to
ensure that all market segments are served.
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As the banking industry has consolidated, despite the improved performance of U.S.
banks, they have been losing market share to other types of financial intermedi-
aries, perhaps as a result of increased competition. (See the table.) Commercial banks
started losing market share to other intermediaries in the mid-1980s (or maybe even
before). The market share of commercial banks has declined from almost 40 percent of
financial intermediary assets in 1960 to under 25 percent in 2005. (The share of total
assets in depositories, which include commercial banks, savings and loans, mutual sav-
ings banks, and credit unions, fell from 60 percent in 1960 to 32 percent in 2005.) Savers
now place a larger share of their savings in mutual funds and pension funds—interme-
diaries that hold securities rather than loans as assets—and put less of their savings in
the bank. Larger firms have been moving away from commercial bank loans toward open
market securities like commercial paper or long-term bonds. The junk bond market is a
source of open market financing for firms that could have borrowed only from banks
before the 1980s. Houston and James (2001) constructed a panel data set documenting
the declining share of bank loans in larger firms’ balance sheets between 1980 and 1993.
Their data show a constant share of bank debt and an increasing share of public debt as
firms’ leverage increased over the latter part of the period.
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Table 
Relative Shares of Total Financial Intermediary Assets
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2003 2005
Insurance companies
Life insurance 20.6 15.0 10.9 11.5 9.4 9.6 9.4
Property and casualty 3.0 2.7 3.5 3.5 2.5 2.4 2.6
Pension funds
Private 3.9 3.2 4.3 4.7 3.2 2.7 2.2
Public (federal, state,
and local government) 3.7 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.1 3.4 2.6
Finance companies and ABS issuers 4.8 4.7 5.1 7.5 12.2 12.9 14.0
Mutual funds
Stock and bond 1.1 1.3 0.8 6.4 8.5 9.2 10.2
Money market 0.0 0.0 1.2 3.8 6.3 5.4 4.6
GSEs, REITs, mortgage companies 2.5 5.1 9.0 14.8 21.2 23.8 22.2
Depository institutions (banks)
Commercial banks 39.1 42.1 39.1 30.2 25.4 23.7 24.6
Savings and loans
and mutual savings banks 20.4 20.4 20.5 11.9 5.3 5.0 5.5
Credit unions 0.9 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Shares are shown in percent. Totals may not sum to 100 percent because of rounding.
Source: Federal Reserve System Flow of Funds Accounts
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The decline in the market share of banking implies that the synergies between
the liability and asset sides of the bank balance sheet have fallen. But the decline in
banks’ market share does not necessarily start on the asset side of the bank’s balance
sheet—it might start on the liability side. That is, it might be a result of a decline in
demand for deposits, rather than a decline in demand for relationship lending. Berlin
and Mester (1999) find empirical evidence of an explicit link between banks’ liability
structure and their distinctive lending behavior. Relationship lending is associated
with lower loan rates, less stringent collateral requirements, a lower likelihood of
credit rationing, more contractual flexibility, and reduced costs of financial distress
for borrowing firms. Core deposits (which are rate inelastic) enable banks to offer
relationship lending by insulating banks’ cost of funds from economic shocks. So core
deposits are a foundation of relationship lending that enables banks to insulate bor-
rowers from economic shocks through multiperiod contracts that insure borrowers
against adverse credit shocks. As banks lose access to core deposits (as savers move
to mutual funds), they can offer less insurance (loan-rate smoothing) to borrowers.
So banks lose market share to intermediaries that hold securities rather than loans.
This process helps explain why we do not just see banks losing market share to enti-
ties offering close substitutes to bank loans and instead see a rise in entities that
issue securities. The declining demand for deposits not only raises banks’ cost of
funds—banks have to pay market rates for funds (directly reducing the supply of
bank loans)—but also reduces the feasibility of relationship lending by banks, reduc-
ing firms’ demand for bank loans as they become less distinctive. In other words, the
banking sector has been shrinking since banks loans have become less “special.”
This specialness of banking can also be found in asset-based lending that a bank
does, that is, operating loans. Mester, Nakamura, and Renault (forthcoming) show
that deposits and asset-based lending are linked. Namely, deposits give banks an
informational advantage. The paper shows empirically that information on the cash
flows into and out of a borrower’s transactions account can help a bank monitor the
changing value of collateral that a commercial borrower has posted for an operating
loan. We find that monthly changes in accounts receivable are reflected in changes in
transaction account balances when the borrower has an exclusive banking relation-
ship with the lender; that the number of prior borrowings in excess of collateral is an
important predictor of credit downgrades and loan write-downs and the lender uses
this information promptly; and that the lender intensifies monitoring as loans deteri-
orate—that is, loan reviews become lengthier and are more frequent. 
Transactions account information is most readily available to commercial banks.
So our results provide a rationale for the coexistence of deposit taking and lending
within a single institution (that is, the commercial bank). But the “specialness” of
commercial banks has likely fallen over time since declines in the cost of information
processing and communication have lowered the cost of the duplication of bank ser-
vices. Indeed, finance company lending has increased substantially relative to com-
mercial bank lending to businesses over the past thirty years—from 17 percent in
1975 to 43 percent in 2005. According to Udell (2004), finance companies and other
asset-based lenders typically require their borrowers to establish special bank
accounts (cash collateral accounts) to keep track of loans collateralized by accounts
receivable. This deposit account is used strictly for the purpose of receiving all remit-
tances on collected receivables. If the asset-based lender is not a bank, then the
account is set up at a bank that works with the asset-based lender. Remittances are
sent to this bank and typically are held for several days by the bank to cover deposit
collectability. Then the asset-based lender draws down these funds and applies them
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA 
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it makes disbursements. The asset-based lender can monitor the cash flows into and
out of these accounts to obtain the same kind of information on its borrowers that a
commercial bank lender can obtain from the borrower’s checking account.
An asset-based lender needs to contract with another intermediary to maintain
the transactions accounts while a bank maintains the checking account on its own, so
the asset-based lender faces higher costs than a bank. But these costs have declined
as information processing and communication costs have declined. The shrinking
cost advantage of banks means less of an offset to the higher regulatory costs banks
face when lending to riskier borrowers. This decline in the bank’s cost advantage may
help explain why finance companies specialize in lending to riskier borrowers, partic-
ularly more leveraged borrowers, as shown by Carey, Post, and Sharpe (1998), while
banks lend to relatively less risky borrowers. 
The implication of the studies by Berlin and Mester (1999) and Mester, Nakamura,
and Renault (forthcoming) is that the decline in traditional commercial bank lending
(that is, relationship lending) relative to transactions lending (securitization) may not
reflect anything about a decline in demand for relationship lending. Instead, it may
reflect a decline in demand for traditional commercial bank liabilities (core deposits),
which makes relationship lending less feasible, or a decline in the information advan-
tage inherent on the liability side of the commercial bank’s balance sheet.
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